Federalist Paper No. 85
Concluding Remarks
From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York.
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in
my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: "the
analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution,'' and "the
additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty,
and to property.'' But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the
progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than
repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of
the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the act
which organizes the government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the
supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects
are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission of a formal
bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press. These and
several others which have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable
on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and a
man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the latter for
imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there
be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of
the plan of the convention among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the
government under which they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan,
for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to property,
to be derived from the adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the
restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and
insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may
acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of
the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the
dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive
military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a
disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government to each;
in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the precautions
against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State governments which have
undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the
breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of
morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with
what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not
failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be
conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided
those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and
which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the
Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has
been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too
wanton and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own
bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the
wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all
sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in
various ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to
demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances
may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend;
it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation;
and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been
neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these papers, the
proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown
upon it; and whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and
necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these
questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to
act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which
nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained by
all the obligations that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly.
No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or
prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper
election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let
him reflect that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the
community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him remember that a majority of
America has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments which
recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am unable to discern any real
force in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our
political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution
has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to
absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. "Why,''
say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect
before it is irrevocably established?'' This may be plausible enough, but it is only
plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been
greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is
radically defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the interests of
the community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the
meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No
advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment, that the
system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the
best that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an
one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of imprudence
to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and to expose the Union to the
jeopardy of successive experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never
expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all
collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as
of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts
which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as
necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can
perfection spring from such materials.
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this
city,1 are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new convention,
under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the
late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there
used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly
well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of
light in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered, and in which it
has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first
taking a survey of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be far
more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The moment an
alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one,
and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout
the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the
contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as it
stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the
chances are as thirteen to nine2 in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the
original adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably
consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be
accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see,
in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the
parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become
the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute the
majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars
which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the
compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in
obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must
evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single
proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for
management or compromise, in relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will of
the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently,
whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment,
that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between
the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a
complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged
that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always be
disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed.
For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon
mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the
government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no
weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on
another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen States at any rate,
independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will,
in my opinion constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of
accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a
further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the
observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur,
will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congres will
be obliged "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States Uwhich
at present amount to ninee, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be
valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the
legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.''
The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention.''
Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all
the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air. Nor however
difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State
legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to
apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the
general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the
State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself deceived
by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth
can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in
the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the
propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution,
must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations
of a writer equally solid and ingenious: "To balance a large state or society Usays
hee, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty,
that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and
reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must
guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences
must correct the mistakes which they INEVITABLY fall into in their first trials and
experiments.''3 These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the
sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding
anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the
military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely
to obtain, but from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of political fortitude,
but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to
treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation,
without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a
Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary ocnsent of a whole people, is a
prodigy, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile
it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise,
upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable a part
of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new
attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in other States, are
enemies to a general national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS.
(Continue to Page 1)
1 Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New York.'' 2 It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three
fourths must ratify. 3 Hume's "Essays,'' vol. i., page 128: "The Rise of Arts and Sciences.''
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