Federalist Paper No. 25
The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 21, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York.
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number
ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But
this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political
association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the
federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to
all, and baneful to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from Maine to
Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of
guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a
common treasury. It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly
exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would
have to sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety,
and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be
equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various
inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to
support the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a
considerable time to come, to bear the burden of competent provisions. The security of all
would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the
resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be
proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole
military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its members, and those
probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have some counterpoise, and
pretenses could easily be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished
by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size; and being
at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the abridgment or
demolition of the national authcrity.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State
governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the
foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any contest between the federal
head and one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with their local
government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should
be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would
afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises upon,
and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the Union. On the other hand, the
liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which left
the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far as an army may be
considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands of which the
people are most likely to be jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be
jealous. For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the people are
always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of
those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the
Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express
terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of
Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and military
establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due
supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the
impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be equally
manifest. The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing
armies in time of peace, though we have never been informed how far it is designed the
prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a
season of tranquillity or not. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise
signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once
raised what shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the
Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week,
a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which
occasioned their being raised continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up
IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once to
deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive
latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This must
undoubtedly be submitted to the national government, and the matter would then be brought
to this issue, that the national government, to provide against apprehended danger, might
in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they
supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to
perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the
force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the
supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the executive and
the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy
would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated
by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired
appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely
concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that
the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once
raised, from whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution of
the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the
prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States would then
exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation
incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded.
As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the
presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to
the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State. We must receive
the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which
nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from,
as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and
liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the
naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice,
dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to
its preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural
bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in
substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United
States that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a
reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion.
The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be
successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less
than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of
the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to
their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could
not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were.
War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by
perserverance, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of
human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the
truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are
dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania,
nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one
or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability
will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The
conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject, though on different ground.
That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the
Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and
still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular
constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is
still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well
as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of
peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this
respect to control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to
the United States, how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be
respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how
unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the post of
admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates,
having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had
before served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The
Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to
their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander
with the real power of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This instance is
selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced
and illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules
and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society.
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that
cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though
dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the
breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other
breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and
palpable.
PUBLIUS.
(Continue to Page 26)
American Historical Documents | Educational Stuff Main | Home
|